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Abstract: This paper examines two factors that help to explain geographic variation in health outcomes. The first 
factor concerns proximity to medical services. The second factor is state-specific health care policy that may 
impede access to nearby medical services. Four key findings are obtained. First, the effect of local doctors on 
reducing mortality rates of various diseases in a county attenuates with distance. Second, at approximately the same 
distance, in-state doctors contribute more to lowering mortality rates in the primary county than do out-of-state 
doctors. Third, the lesser impact of nearby out-of-state doctors is further reduced when the primary state adopts 
more stringent policies that restrict entry of out-of-state physicians. Fourth, the impact of nearby doctors is found to 
be stronger in more urbanized areas. This is consistent with agglomeration economies being effective in 
contributing, at least in part, to the productivity of treating patients. 
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1. Introduction 
Mortality rates for heart disease, cancer, and stroke differ dramatically across locations in the United 
States. As shown in Fig. 1a, Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c, mortality rates associated with these diseases are 
generally the highest in certain eastern rural states, such as West Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, and the 
lowest in states like Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. Traditional explanations for geographic variation in 
health outcomes have mainly focused on the impact of health care expenditures and environmental 
factors.1 This paper extends the literature by examining the effect of proximity to medical professionals 
on local population health outcomes and the degree to which state physician licensing policies reduce the 
impact of out-of-state physicians. A better understanding of these factors is important for improving 
national health since restricted access to medical services is one of the leading causes for poor health 
outcomes in lightly developed areas.2 
 
                                                          
1
 Previous studies examining the impact of health care expenditures find inconsistent evidence. Studies using available cross-
sectional datasets show almost complete absence of a positive relationship between expenditures and the quality of care (Fisher 
et al., 2003a, Fisher et al., 2003b, Baicker and Chandra, 2004 and Fisher et al., 2009). In contrast, instrumental variables and 
panel data evidence suggest that higher spending is associated with significantly lower mortality (McClellae et al., 1994, 
Cutler, 2007, Chandra and Staiger, 2007 and Doyle, 2011). 
2
 See, for example, Casey et al. (2001), and Coughlin et al. (2002). 




Fig. 1a. State variation in mortality rates (per 100,000 residents) for heart disease. 
 
Fig. 1b. State variation in mortality rates (per 100,000 residents) for cancer. 
 
Fig. 1c. State variation in mortality rates (per 100,000 residents) for stroke. 
 
 




The focus on proximity to medical professionals in explaining local health status is motivated by sharp 
urban–rural differences in patient outcomes.3 Using data from the Compressed Mortality File (CMF), 
Table 1a reports mortality rates from heart disease, cancer, and stroke for areas with different degrees of 
urbanization. As shown in the table, mortality rates are significantly lower in large cities relative to small 
cities or remote “non-core” areas. For instance, while the mortality rate for heart disease is as low as 214 
per 100,000 residents for large metropolitan areas, it rises up to 248 per 100,000 residents for “non-core” 
areas. Similar patterns can also be found for cancer and stroke. 
 
Table 1a. Mortality rates (per 100,000 residents) stratified by urbanization level. 
Urbanization levela Heart disease Cancer Stroke 
Large metrob 214.1 138.8 46.2 
Medium metroc 219.0 147.6 52.6 
Small metrod 225.5 152.1 56.0 
Micropolitane 240.4 155.1 56.7 
Noncoref 247.6 156.9 57.6 
    
F-test of equal mortality rates  154.0 120.2 134.6 
 
a. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) has developed an urban–rural classification scheme for U.S. counties 
and county-equivalents. The classification scheme is based on 2003 Rural–Urban Continuum Codes and 2003 Urban 
Influence Codes released by Economic Research Service (ERS). 
b. Large metro areas contain counties in metro area of at least 1 million residents or more. 
c. Medium metro areas contain counties in metro area of 250,000–999,999 population. 
d. Small metro areas contain counties in metro area of 50,000–249,999 population. 
e. Micropolitan areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000–49,999 (adjacent to metro area). 
f. Noncore areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000–49,999 (not adjacent to metro area) and counties 
with population below 20,000. 
One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that larger metropolitan areas provide residents with 
better access to medical services. This is suggested by Table 1b, which shows that medical services, as 
measured by the number of doctors per capita, are highly concentrated in large cities. For instance, more 
than 100 cardiologists per ten million residents are present in large metropolitan areas, but only 28 are 
present per ten million residents in lightly developed “non-core” areas. This, together with Table 1a, 
further suggests that better access to medical professionals likely contributes to lower mortality rates from 
heart disease, cancer and stroke. 
 
  
                                                          
3
 In the United States, residents in rural areas generally have poorer health than those in more urbanized areas. See, for 
example, Eberhardt and Pamuk, 2004 and Eberhardt and Ingram, 2001, and Ricketts (1999). 




Table 1b. Number of doctors per 100,000 residents stratified by urbanization level. 
Urbanization levela Doctors Cardiologists Oncologists Neurologists 
Large metrob 40.63 1.01 0.68 0.19 
Medium metroc 33.93 0.84 0.50 0.18 
Small metrod 32.43 0.84 0.53 0.19 
Micropolitane 12.81 0.23 0.14 0.05 
Noncoref 20.86 0.28 0.19 0.07 
     
F-test of equal medical capacity 85.86 110.86 84.11 65.39 
 
a. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) has developed an urban–rural classification scheme for U.S. counties 
and county-equivalents. The classification scheme is based on 2003 Rural–Urban Continuum Codes and 2003 Urban 
Influence Codes released by Economic Research Service (ERS). 
b. Large metro areas contain counties in metro area of at least 1 million residents or more. 
c. Medium metro areas contain counties in metro area of 250,000–999,999 population. 
d. Small metro areas contain counties in metro area of 50,000–249,999 population. 
e. Micropolitan areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000–49,999 (adjacent to metro area). 
f. Noncore areas contain counties with urban population of 20,000–49,999 (not adjacent to metro area) and counties 
with population below 20,000. 
 
A second factor that may also help to explain lower mortality rates in large cities is that doctors may be 
more productive in urban areas populated with large numbers of medical professionals. This would be 
consistent with literature on agglomeration economies, which has provided evidence that productivity is 
often enhanced when companies operate in agglomerated locations.4 The increase in productivity is 
thought to arise from a combination of learning from nearby workers and firms (i.e., knowledge 
spillovers), sharing of valuable intermediate input providers (i.e., input sharing), and/or opportunities to 
draw upon skilled pools of nearby labor (i.e., labor market pooling).5 
Both explanations suggest that the impact of doctors on local patient outcomes will diminish with 
distance. High travel costs associated with long distances impede access to nearby medical services. 
Potential spillover effects that may enhance physician productivities in treating patients also tend to 
attenuate with distance, as suggested in the literature.6 
The first goal of this paper is to examine the extent to which proximity to medical services affects local 
patient outcomes and how quickly the impact of nearby doctors attenuates with geographic distance. To 
this end, I examine the impact of key features of the local medical industry (e.g., the number of 
physicians) in two concentric rings that extend out to fifty miles from the geographic centroid of a 
                                                          
4
 This idea is introduced in Marshall (1920) and surveyed extensively in later literature (Quigley, 1998, Rosenthal and Strange, 
2004 and Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). 
5
 See, for instance, Glaeser and Maré (2001), and Moretti (2004) for evidence of knowledge spillovers, Holmes, 1999 and 
Ellison et al., 2010, and Li (2013) for evidence of input sharing, and Rosenthal and Strange (2001), and Costa and Kahn (2000) 
for evidence of labor market pooling. 
6
 See, Rosenthal and Strange, 2003, Rosenthal and Strange, 2005, Rosenthal and Strange, 2008 and Andersson et al., 2009, and 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2008). 




primary county.7 As will become apparent, the medical environment in the inner ring has a notably 
stronger effect on nearby population health outcomes. 
A second goal of the paper is to identify the possible presence of state border effects that may impede the 
ability of physicians to practice across state lines and thereby reduce the impact of out-of-state physicians 
on nearby patient outcomes. Such effects may arise because of state-specific medical licensing 
regulations and related policies that govern reciprocity of physician licensing across state boundaries.8 By 
comparing the influence of doctors just on either side of a state border, I show that the impact of out-of-
state doctors on nearby patient outcomes is smaller than that of in-state doctors. The in-state versus out-
of-state difference is attributable, at least in part, to state physician licensing laws: results indicate that the 
lesser impact of out-of-state doctors is further reduced for states with more stringent licensing policies. 
As an alternative approach, I also experiment with measures of the per capita number of physicians in a 
state and the number of physicians per square mile in a state as indicators of the statewide medical policy 
environment. These measures are motivated by reports that rural states are more proactive in trying to 
attract medical professionals to their locations.9 Evidence from this alternative approach is similar to 
when a direct measure of the policy environment is used in the model specification. 
Findings in this paper contribute to two distinct but important literatures. The first is the health economics 
literature. By examining the influence of state medical licensing policy and proximity to medical services 
on local patient outcomes, I offer a new perspective on geographic variation in health outcomes. Evidence 
of state border effects also points to inefficiencies in the health care system and, in this sense, yields 
important policy implications for state reciprocity agreements. This is particularly important in the 
context of rising health care expenditures.10 
This paper also contributes to the literature on the presence of agglomeration economies in the hospital 
service industry. Numerous studies have provided evidence that productivity is often enhanced when 
companies operate in concentrated areas, but only a few of these studies have considered the health care 
industry.11 This paper further enriches the literature by showing that the impact of nearby doctors is 
stronger in more urbanized areas. I argue that this evidence is consistent with the idea that concentrations 
of medical services improve doctor’s productivity of treating patients and, in this sense, supports the 
presence of hospital productivity spillovers at agglomerated locations.12 
                                                          
7
 As a comparison, the median of county area in the United States is 645.18 square miles, which corresponds to a circle with a 
14.33-mile radius; the seventy-fifth percentile is 973.41 square miles, which corresponds to a circle with a 17.61-mile radius. 
8
 Data source: State Medical Licensure Requirements and Statistics, American Medical Association. Details of this policy are 
discussed in Section 2. 
9
 Texas, for instance, has invested in expanding residency opportunities beyond the number of medical students in Texas with 
the aim of attracting more out-of-state medical graduates to Texas. http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2010/11/addressing-
physician-shortage-texas.html. 
10
 The rise in health care expenditures over time has been documented in Chernew et al. (2003), and Bodenheimer (2005), for 
instance. 
11
 Baicker and Chandra, 2010 and Cohen and Morrison Paul, 2008, and Li (2013) are among the few that examine productivity 
gains from agglomeration in the health care industry. 
12
 There are two caveats to this argument that should be noted for completeness. The first is that patients with greater health 
problems may seek treatment in large cities where more medical services are provided. This behavior would predict poor 
underlying health of the patient pool in medically concentrated areas. As a result, the estimated impact of nearby doctors in big 
cities could suffer from downward bias. The second caveat concerns doctors’ abilities. The idea is that more talented doctors or 




The empirical work to follow is based on two datasets at the county level: the Compressed Mortality File 
(CMF) and the Area Resource File (ARF).13 Separate regressions are carried out for three types of 
diseases: heart disease, cancer, and stroke. Mortality rates associated with these diseases at the county 
level are obtained from the CMF and are used as proxies for health outcomes. A wide set of medical 
factors are extracted from the ARF and are converted into concentric ring variables and further partial 
concentric rings based on how the rings are intersected by state lines. This specification improves upon 
previous studies by including a richer palette of explanatory variables that capture the distribution of local 
medical services. 
I obtain four key results. First, the impact of nearby medical professionals on local population health 
outcomes attenuates with geographic distance. For example, focusing on doctors residing inside the state, 
doubling the number of doctors within 25 miles reduces the mortality rate for heart disease in a county by 
6.26%. This effect drops to 0.46% for doctors within the 25–50 mile distance band. Similar attenuation 
patterns can also be found for adjacent out-of-state doctors, as well as for other types of diseases 
considered in this paper. Second, in-state doctors contribute more to lowering mortality rates in the 
primary county than do out-of-state doctors. Focusing only on the 25-mile ring, doubling the number of 
nearby in-state doctors reduces the mortality rate for stroke by 8.82%, which is 3.75 higher in percentage 
points than the corresponding out-of-state effect. Third, the smaller impact of out-of-state doctors is 
further reduced if the physician licensing policy adopted by the primary state is more likely to restrict 
entry of out-of-state physicians. The results are robust when the statewide medical policy environment is 
further instrumented by per-capita number of doctors and number of doctors per square mile. Fourth, after 
having stratified the sample by population density, I find that the impact of both in-state doctors and out-
of-state doctors are stronger in more urbanized areas. This evidence also suggests that concentrations of 
medical services may generate spillovers that help to improve the productivity of treating patients. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses state-specific medical licensing policies 
that restrict out-of-state doctors from practicing in-state. Section 3 presents the empirical framework. 
Section 4 describes data and variables. Section 5 shows the empirical results, highlighting the impact of 
proximity to medical services, the influence of state borders, and the role of state-specific licensing 
policies in the imposition of barriers for out-of-state doctors to practice across state lines. Finally, Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. State-specific medical licensing policies 
Each state in the United States has its own board of medicine that licenses and regulates the practice of 
state physicians. Over time, various licensing boards have developed distinctive laws and regulations to 
ensure the health, safety and welfare of their citizens. The variation in medical regulations and a lack of 
universal reciprocity between states impose barriers for physicians who are currently holding an active 
license in one jurisdiction to practice in another. In particular, a physician who is intent on providing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
doctors with higher abilities may sort into large cities (Di Addario, 2011 and Combes et al., 2008). This implies that lower 
mortality rates in concentrated areas could result from doctors in these areas being more capable of treating patients. This 
sorting behavior leads to the overestimation of the impact of availability of doctors in concentrated areas. The net impact of 
these two sorting incentives is unclear. 
13
 Details regarding these two data files are provided in Section 4. 




patient care in another state is required to go through a complicated application process in order to obtain 
a fully unrestricted medical license from this state.14 
The application process is referred to as the licensure endorsement. It is generally based on 
documentation of successfully completing approved examinations, authentication of required core 
documents, and completion of any additional requirements assessing the applicant’s fitness to practice 
medicine in the new jurisdiction.15 The high level of standard requires efforts that are viewed as 
duplicative and time-consuming. For example, applicants may be asked to participate in extensive 
interviews or, in other instances, to retake and pass current licensing exams if it has been more than a 
certain number of years since the applicant passed his or her then-current exam. There can be 
considerable expenses in terms of time and cost associated with preparing interviews or taking exams, 
particularly for specialists who have limited the scope of their practice for a certain period of time. 
There are sizable variations in specific requirements of endorsement policies from one state to another. 
Differences are shown in three main aspects: application fees for licensure endorsement, interview 
requirements and maximum years since passing the board examination.16 Taking year 2007 as an example 
and as shown in Table 2, thirty-four states require candidates applying for licensure endorsement to show 
up for a comprehensive interview; eleven states stipulate that a license can only be endorsed within a 
certain number of years after the applicant passed his or her most recent medical board examination. 
Among the eleven states with maximum year constraint, Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas require doctors to refresh their exam records if it 
has been more than 10 years since they initially took the exam. The other three states (Idaho, Oregon, and 
Maryland) have similar but slightly different requirements regarding when exam records expire for 
endorsement (5, 7, and 15 years, respectively). State variation in interview requirements and maximum 
year constraints has been generally consistent over time. 
I define a state as having “stringent policies” if it restricts the entry of out-of-state physicians by adopting 
either the interview requirement or the maximum year constraint. I differentiate neither the different 
extent of the maximum year constraint nor its influence relative to that of a comprehensive interview.17 
The grouping of the licensing requirements is suggested by empirical evidence, and it also helps to pick 
up a stronger signal as I expect that the states that adopt either of these requirements are significantly 
different from the other states that have no requirement at all, in terms of their policy impacts on patient 
outcomes. Out of forty-nine states in the continental United States, thirty-six are classified as those with 
                                                          
14
 State specific medical licensing rules are alleged to protect the public from unprofessional, improper, incompetent, unlawful, 
fraudulent, or deceptive practice of medicine (Federation of State Medical Boards). However, the underlying driving force to 
its existence may also involve domestic doctors lobbying against the entry of out-of-state doctors to gain certain monopoly 
power. This would be consistent with the famous notion of Regulatory Capture developed by George Stigler in the Economic 
Theory of Regulation, which argues that political participants may use the regulatory power of the government to shape laws 
and regulations to advance the commercial or special concerns of an interest group. 
15
 State Medical Licensure Requirements and Statistics, American Medical Association. 
16
 Maximum years since passing board examination refer to the maximum number of years it takes for an out-of-state doctor’s 
exam record to expire for endorsement application to practice in a particular state. 
17
 Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends. American Medical Association. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-
ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/young-physicians-section/advocacy-resources/physician-licensure-an-update-
trends.page. 




more demanding application procedures for licensure endorsement. States with stringent medical 
licensing policies based on this definition are highlighted in bold in Table 2. 























Alabama 175 NO 10 Nebraska 202 NO – 
Arizona 500 YES 10 Nevada 600 YES – 
Arkansas 400 NO – New Hampshire 250 NO – 
California 1295 NO – New Jersey 225 YES – 
Colorado 425 NO – New Mexico 400 YES – 
Connecticut 450 NO – New York 735 NO – 
Delaware 301 YES – North Carolina 350 YES 10 
Washington, DC 305 NO – North Dakota 200 YES – 
Florida 500 YES – Ohio 335 NO – 
Georgia 400 YES – Oklahoma 400 YES – 
Idaho 400 YES 5 Oregon 375 YES 7 
Illinois 300 YES – Pennsylvania 20 NO – 
Indiana 250 YES – Rhode Island 570 YES – 
Iowa 505 YES – South Carolina 600 YES 10 
Kansas 300 YES – South Dakota 200 YES – 
Kentucky 300 NO – Tennessee 235 YES – 
Louisiana 382 YES 10 Texas 885 YES 10 
Maine 450 YES – Utah 200 YES – 
Maryland 822 NO 15 Vermont 600 YES – 
Massachusetts 600 YES – Virginia 302 YES – 
Michigan 150 NO – Washington 425 NO – 
Minnesota 200 YES 10 West Virginia 300 YES – 
Mississippi 600 YES 10 Wisconsin 110 YES – 
Missouri 300 YES – Wyoming 600 YES – 
Montana 325 YES –     
a. Interview requirements refer to the fact that physicians are required to participate in comprehensive interviews in 
order to obtain another fully unrestricted license from the target state board of medicine. 
b. Maximum years since passing the board exam stipulate how long it takes for an out-of-state doctor’s exam record to 
expire for endorsement to practice in the target state. 
 
3. Empirical framework 
This section describes the empirical framework that motivates the analysis to follow. The modeling 
approach is built upon the literature on agglomeration economies, which suggests that concentrations of 
economic activities promote productivity. Numerous studies have provided evidence in the manufacturing 
sector.18 Similar spillover effects in the health care industry have been explored in a few recent studies, 
                                                          
18
 To name a few, see Holmes, 1999 and Rosenthal and Strange, 2001, and Ellison et al. (2010). 




which find significant localization effects.19 That is, when the scale of the local health care industry is 
large, patient outcomes improve (Baicker and Chandra, 2010), and local hospitals are more likely to 
outsource intermediate medical services (Li, 2013) and run at a lower cost (Cohen and Morrison Paul, 
2008). 
The existence of agglomeration economies in the hospital service industry further suggests that the impact 
of concentrations of nearby doctors may attenuate rapidly across geographic space. This is suggested by 
studies that explore the geographic scope of agglomeration economies.20 The idea is then captured 
graphically in Fig. 2, where the horizontal axis denotes locations and the vertical axis represents the 
magnitude of the impact of doctors located at various distances. The solid line at the center points to the 
location of the primary county’s geographic centroid, and as illustrated by the dashed line, the impact of 
nearby doctors attenuates gradually with geographic distance. Given that state medical licensing policies 
likely restrict the entry of out-of-state doctors to practice in-state, the impact of nearby doctors is then 
expected to drop discretely at state boundaries and continue with its attenuation pattern afterwards. 
 
Fig. 2. Spatial attenuation of the influence of nearby medical professionals and the impact of state borders. 
 
To illustrate the idea of spatial attenuation and the state border effect, I begin by assuming that the 
county-level health production function follows a Cobb–Douglas functional form. That is, 
   equation(3.1) 
                                                          
19
 As established in the literature, agglomeration economies pertain to external economies of scale and are often divided into 
two types. Those that respect industry boundaries are often referred to as localization economies. Those that extend beyond 
industry boundaries and focus, instead, on the scale associated with city size are referred to as urbanization economies. 
20
 As established in the literature, agglomeration economies pertain to external economies of scale and are often divided into 
two types. Those that respect industry boundaries are often referred to as localization economies. Those that extend beyond 
industry boundaries and focus, instead, on the scale associated with city size are referred to as urbanization economies. 




To capture the geographic attenuation of spillover effects, all the key features of the local medical 
industry (e.g., number of doctors, nurses and hospital beds) are specified as concentric rings that extend 
out to fifty miles around the geographic centroid of the primary county.21 To capture the difference in the 
extent of spillovers associated with in-state and out-of-state medical services, each concentric ring 
variable is further divided into the portion belonging to the same state and the portion overlapping the 
neighboring states. This specification helps to capture state border effects, while also allowing for and 
controlling for geographic attenuation. 
The estimation equation is, thus, specified as follows, 
equation (3.2) 
In this expression, the superscript 0–25 indicates that the corresponding variables are defined for the 0–25 
mile inner ring and 25–50 represents variables associated with the 25–50 mile outer ring. The subscript is 
stands for county i in state s, while the subscript i(−s) denotes the portion of the concentric ring formed 
around the centroid of county i but overlapping the neighboring states. X is a vector of county-level 
demographic controls. µ captures the state fixed effect. This specification improves upon previous studies 
by including a richer palette of explanatory variables that capture the distribution of local medical 
services. It also produces a set of estimates that allow for direct comparison of the impact of doctors at 
various locations. 
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 To strike a balance between maintaining sufficient power to reliably estimate the model while also retaining as much 
precision as possible, I specify two distance bands: 0–25 miles and 25–50 miles. This specification is based on the observation 
that 25 miles are close to the maximum commuting distance for medical practitioners who must be able to travel to the hospital 
quickly given long work hours and periodic emergencies. 




Although tempting, we cannot simply compare the estimates associated with in-state versus out-of-state 
doctors and attribute the lesser impact of out-of-state doctors to state licensing policies that impede the 
entry of out-of-state doctors to practice in-state. This is because, in some instances, patients may not be 
mobile across state lines, especially when their insurance network coincides with state boundaries.22 It is 
likely that the impact of out-of-state doctors is smaller because it is more costly for patients to travel 
across the border and access out-of-state doctors. 
The identification of the state border effect also relies on the assumption that the specified concentric 
rings are sufficient to capture the attenuation gradient. In other words, the impact of doctors associated 
with each distance band is assumed to be fairly homogenous. However, if the attenuation of spillover 
effects is more spatially continuous, the difference between β1 source and β4 should be better interpreted 
as a mix of the attenuation and the state border effect. This is because the in-state 25-mile partial ring 
captures medical inputs that are distributed closer to the centroid of the primary county, while the 
corresponding out-of-state measure tends to capture inputs distributed further away. 
These issues are addressed by further exploring exogenous variation in stringency of state medical 
licensing policies, as discussed in detail in Section 2. Specifically, a dummy variable indicating whether a 
state adopts more stringent licensing policies is interacted with out-of-state doctor measures. If state 
borders impede access to nearby medical services due to state-specific licensing laws, the lesser impact of 
out-of-state doctors will be further reduced for states with more stringent policies, which will then be 
captured by the coefficient of the interaction term. The identification assumption is that the adoption of 
more stringent licensing policies is not correlated with unobserved factors, such as restrictions on patient 
inter-state travel, which may also contribute to the border effect. Based on this assumption, I identify 
whether the state border effect exists and if so, whether it is attributable, at least in part, to state medical 
licensing regulations that restrict the entry of out-of-state doctors to practice in-state. 
 
4. Data and variables 
The empirical analysis is based on two primary data sources. The first is the Compressed Mortality File 
(CMF), from which I obtain county-level mortality rates for the three most life-threatening diseases: heart 
disease, cancer, and stroke.23 Mortality rates associated with each type of disease in a county are 
calculated as the number of deaths from the disease between 1999 and 2007 divided by the standard 
population reported in 2000 decennial census.24 Heart disease is defined by the ICD-10 codes ranging 
from GR113-055 to GR113-068, cancer is from GR113-020 to GR113-036, and stroke is defined by 
GR113-070.25 
                                                          
22
 For example, Medicaid insurance policies are administered by the state government and, therefore, tend to include only state 
licensed physicians within the insurance network. 
23
 The ranking for causes of death can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lcod.htm. 
24
 Compressed Mortality File 1999–2007 can be accessed through CDC WONDER On-line Database: 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd10.htm. The data file is compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National 
Center for Health Statistics. 
25
 The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10) is a coding of 
diseases, signs and symptoms, abnormal findings, complaints, social circumstances and external causes of injury or diseases, 
as classified by the World Health Organization (WHO). 




The second data source is the Area Resource File (ARF), which is published by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA). This file provides the numbers of doctors, nurses and hospital beds at 
the county level. For measures of doctor capacity, I focus particularly on the numbers of cardiologists, 
oncologists, and neurologists corresponding to heart disease, cancer and stroke considered in this paper. 
This helps to capture the impact of the most relevant medical professionals. These variables, together 
with the numbers of nurses and hospital beds, are further converted into partial concentric ring variables 
using Geographic Information System (GIS) software (MapInfo and MapBasic, in this instance). 
Several steps are taken to form the concentric ring variables. First, circles of radius 25 and 50 miles are 
drawn around the geographic centroid of each county. Second, treating doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) 
within a given county as uniformly distributed throughout the area, the number of doctors (nurses, or 
hospital beds) contained in a given created circle is calculated by constructing a proportional sum of the 
measure associated with each portion of the county intersected by the given circle. Third, doctors (nurses, 
or hospital beds) in adjacent circles are differentiated to obtain the corresponding measure within the 
corresponding concentric ring. Finally, the number of doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) within a given 
concentric ring is further decomposed into the portion that belongs to the primary state and the portion 
overlapping the neighboring states. 
The construction of the proportional sum measure is better presented in Fig. 3. For example, for county 
A, a 25-mile circle around its centroid intersects seven neighboring counties. Assuming doctors (nurses, 
or hospital beds) in each county are uniformly distributed throughout the area, the measure associated 
with the shaded portion of each county can be calculated by simply applying the area weight of the 
portion. In this way, the number of doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) within the circle is calculated as the 
sum of the doctors (nurses, or hospital beds) belonging to each shaded portion of the counties (including 
A itself) that overlap the circle. 
Fig. 3. Number of doctors (nurses, hospital beds) within a given circle calculated using proportional sum method. 
 
To further control for environmental factors that may also influence patient outcomes, I extract a set of 
standard demographic variables from the ARF. These include the percentage of uninsured population, the 
percentage of residents greater than 65 years old, per capita income, the percentage of people in poverty, 
the percentage of Black inhabitants, the percentage of Asian inhabitants, the percentage of Hispanic 
inhabitants, and the percentage of people with lower than high school education. In addition, in all of the 
models that I adopt later, state fixed effects are included to capture unobserved differences across states 
that may also help to explain patient outcomes, such as weather and diet. 




Table 3 provides summary statistics of the variables that enter the estimation equation. As shown in the 
table, the average mortality rate for heart disease is 0.29%, highest among all three. The average mortality 
rates for cancer and stroke are 0.18% and 0.07%, respectively. These three diseases are listed as the most 
life threatening diseases, according to the statistics published by the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention. This is also the reason that I focus on these diseases for my analysis. At the same time, means 
and standard deviations are also reported for medical professionals, nurses, and hospital beds in each 
county, as well as in partial concentric rings measured separately for the in-state portion and the out-of-
state portion.26 Summary statistics for county-level demographic attributes are provided towards the end 
of the table. 
Table 3. Summary statistics.a 
 Mean Std. dev. 
Mortality rate of heart disease (%) 0.29 0.09 
Mortality rate of cancer (%) 0.18 0.04 
Mortality rate of stroke (%) 0.07 0.03 
Cardiologists 7.00 30.06 
Cardiologists_0–25_in-state 21.98 74.35 
Cardiologists_0–25_out-of-state 5.82 43.87 
Cardiologists_25–50_in-state 42.07 76.25 
Cardiologists_25–50_out-of-state 19.41 81.96 
Oncologists 1.40 5.84 
Oncologists_0–25_in-state 5.06 12.24 
Oncologists_0–25_out-of-state 1.81 6.70 
Oncologists_25–50_in-state 9.34 14.10 
Oncologists_25–50_out-of-state 4.27 13.26 
Neurologists 4.55 21.06 
Neurologists_0–25_in-state 14.81 53.19 
Neurologists_0–25_out-of-state 4.25 32.57 
Neurologists_25–50_in-state 27.40 51.57 
Neurologists_25–50_out-of-state 13.03 57.40 
Nurses 418.30 1516.97 
Nurses_0–25_in-state 1209.57 3147.51 
Nurses_0–25_out-of-state 233.93 1815.55 
Nurses_25–50_in-state 2559.82 3602.38 
Nurses_25–50_out-of-state 976.16 3440.44 
Hospital beds 311.06 1014.34 
Hospital beds_0–25_in-state 896.74 2204.19 
Hospital beds_0–25_out-of-state 173.84 1336.77 
Hospital beds_25–50_in-state 1902.94 2442.34 
Hospital beds_25–50_out-of-state 724.89 2447.77 
% Black 8.84 14.57 
% Asian 1.06 1.95 
% Hispanic 6.21 12.05 
% of uninsured 20.68 6.69 
% of >65 years old 15.71 4.17 
Per capita income 30347.01 8127.01 
% in poverty 15.12 6.24 
% of <high school 9.11 5.25 
% of unemployed 4.85 1.69 
a. Sample contains 3108 counties in total. 
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 Medical input variables are inflated by one in order to avoid zeros that render invalidity when constructing the key 
regressors in log terms. 





5.1. How quickly does the impact of doctors attenuate? 
This section discusses the impact of proximity to medical services on local patient outcomes. Table 4a 
shows results when mortality rates are used directly as proxies for patient outcomes (log mortality rates as 
dependent variables). Table 4b reports estimates when patient outcomes are represented as an exponential 
function of the quality indicators (mortality rates as dependent variables). As a further robustness check, I 
also estimate the log–linear specification and report the results in Table 4c. The following discussion will 
focus on Table 4a, but similar results can also be found in Table 4b and Table 4c. 
Table 4a. Attenuation and state border effects.a Dependent variable: Log Mortality Rates of various diseases (%) (t 
statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors). 
 Heart disease Cancer Stroke 
       
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0–25_in-state −0.0660*** −0.0626*** −0.0533*** −0.0524*** −0.0882*** −0.0892*** 
 (−8.11) (−7.32) (−5.73) (−5.76) (−8.25) (−7.46) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0110 −0.0056 −0.0094 −0.0040 −0.0507*** −0.0396*** 
 (−1.42) (−0.71) (−1.29) (−0.54) (−4.79) (−3.67) 
Log (specialists per bed)_25–50_in-state – −0.0046 – −0.0004 – 0.0065 
 – (−0.47) – (−0.06) – (0.51) 
Log (specialists per bed)_25–50_out-of-state – −0.0029 – −0.0053 – −0.0214*** 
 – (−0.50) – (−1.05) – (−2.65) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0–25_in-state −0.0519*** −0.0402** −0.0155 −0.0157 −0.0167 −0.0042 
 (−3.55) (−2.58) (−1.18) (−1.25) (−0.87) (−0.21) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0337** −0.0245 −0.0065 −0.0057 −0.0227 −0.0150 
 (−2.41) (−1.64) (−0.64) (−0.52) (−1.08) (−0.65) 
Log (nurses per bed)_25–50_in-state – −0.0306 – 0.0006 – −0.0469 
 – (−1.41) – (0.03) – (−1.54) 
Log (nurses per bed)_25–50_out-of-state – −0.0213 – 0.0015 – 0.0083 
 – (−1.34) – (0.11) – (0.37) 
Log (hospital beds)_0–25_in-state −0.0051 −0.0025 −0.0171*** −0.0155*** −0.0168** −0.0178** 
 (−1.05) (−0.46) (−3.62) (−3.13) (−2.39) (−2.31) 
Log (hospital beds)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0051 −0.0061 −0.0064 −0.0042 −0.0441*** −0.0347*** 
 (−0.86) (−1.03) (−0.99) (−0.65) (−5.22) (−4.05) 
Log (hospital beds)_25–50_in-state – −0.0020 – −0.0025 – 0.0053 
 – (−0.36) – (−0.56) – (0.71) 
Log (hospital beds)_25–50_out-of-state – 0.0044 – −0.0012 – −0.0134** 
 – (1.03) – (−0.27) – (−2.08) 
       
State fixed effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 3108 3108 3108 3108 3105 3105 
R-squared 0.705 0.707 0.721 0.722 0.518 0.520 
*p < 0.1.  ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
a. Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. 
Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of >65 years old, per 








Table 4b. Attenuation and state border effects (linear–log model).a Dependent variable: Mortality Rates 
of various diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors). 
 Heart disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0–25_in-state −0.0174*** −0.0150*** −0.0083*** −0.0077*** −0.0059*** −0.0059*** 
 (−8.57) (−6.92) (−7.31) (−6.60) (−9.27) (−8.02) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0042** −0.0028 −0.0020* −0.0013 −0.0029*** −0.0020*** 
 (−2.15) (−1.39) (−1.88) (−1.13) (−4.63) (−3.15) 
Log (specialists per bed)_25–50_in-state – −0.0061** – −0.0014 – 0.0002 
 – (−2.35) – (−1.28) – (0.25) 
Log (specialists per bed)_25–50_out-of-state – −0.0011 – −0.0010 – −0.0015*** 
 – (−0.70) – (−1.26) – (−2.70) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0–25_in-state −0.0118*** −0.0108*** −0.0023 −0.0029 −0.0009 0.0002 
 (−3.04) (−2.70) (−1.25) (−1.55) (−0.74) (0.13) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0108*** −0.0077* −0.0011 −0.0012 −0.0028* −0.0019 
 (−2.72) (−1.78) (−0.66) (−0.64) (−1.76) (−1.05) 
Log (nurses per bed)_25–50_in-state – 0.0000 – 0.0019 – −0.0039* 
 – (0.00) – (0.76) – (−1.92) 
Log (nurses per bed)_25–50_out-of-state – −0.0071 – 0.0007 – −0.0004 
 – (−1.59) – (0.34) – (−0.27) 
Log (hospital beds)_0–25_in-state −0.0030*** −0.0021 −0.0031*** −0.0027*** −0.0018*** −0.0019*** 
 (−2.68) (−1.63) (−4.70) (−3.81) (−4.32) (−4.14) 
Log (hospital beds)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0022 −0.0023 −0.0015 −0.0011 −0.0024*** −0.0018*** 
 (−1.52) (−1.52) (−1.62) (−1.17) (−5.12) (−3.58) 
Log (hospital beds)_25–50_in-state – −0.0005 – −0.0007 – 0.0006 
 – (−0.34) – (−1.08) – (1.26) 
Log (hospital beds)_25–50_out-of-state – 0.0007 – −0.0005 – −0.0009* 
 – (0.62) – (−0.70) – (−1.93) 
       
State fixed effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 3108 3108 3108 3108 3105 3105 
R-squared 0.684 0.687 0.743 0.744 0.478 0.481 
*p < 0.1.  ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
a. Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. 
Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of >65 years old, per 
capita income, % in poverty, % of <high school, and unemployment rate (%). 
 
In Table 4a, estimates are reported separately for heart disease, cancer, and stroke. For each type of 
disease, I first run OLS regressions with only 25-mile ring controls. I then add 25–50 mile rings to 
capture possible attenuation effects. The estimated coefficient associated with the closer distance band is 
both higher in magnitude and more significant. Focusing only on the in-state portion and taking heart 
disease as an example, the estimated elasticity of cardiologists within 25 miles is 0.0626 (the absolute 
value of the estimated coefficient in 1st row, column (b)). This effect is much stronger than cardiologists 
present in the 25–50 mile concentric ring (0.0046 in 3rd row, column (b)). For other types of diseases, the 
estimated elasticities of the 25-mile ring measures are generally of higher magnitude than those 
corresponding to the 25–50 mile concentric rings. Similar patterns can also be found for other medical 
inputs.27 
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 The impact of out-of-state hospital beds on mortality rates from stroke is stronger than the corresponding in-state effect. This 
may or may not have something to do with the fact that people suffering from stroke require urgent treatment. 





Table 4c. Attenuation and state border effects (log–linear model).a Dependent variable: Log Mortality Rates of 
various diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors). 
 Heart disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Specialists per bed_0–25_in-state −1.6288*** −1.5189*** −3.4461*** −3.5769*** −2.4649*** −2.6840*** 
 (−2.89) (−2.64) (−3.29) (−3.22) (−3.11) (−3.03) 
Specialists per bed_0–25_out-of-state −0.0250*** −0.0049 −0.0105* −0.0019 −0.0073 0.0012 
 (−2.99) (−0.51) (−1.72) (−0.29) (−0.61) (0.09) 
Specialists per bed_25–50_in-state – −0.1959 – −2.0184 – −1.6412* 
 – (−0.29) – (−1.15) – (−1.80) 
Specialists per bed_25–50_out-of-state – −0.0371*** – −0.0171** – −0.0298** 
 – (−3.54) – (−2.10) – (−2.07) 
Nurses per bed_0–25_in-state −0.0866*** −0.0733*** −0.0276** −0.0263** −0.0489** −0.0351 
 (−5.46) (−4.29) (−2.21) (−2.05) (−2.40) (−1.60) 
Nurses per bed_0–25_out-of-state −0.0422*** −0.0376*** −0.0091 −0.0099 −0.0485*** −0.0381* 
 (−3.39) (−2.78) (−0.97) (−1.00) (−2.63) (−1.96) 
Nurses per bed_25–50_in-state – −0.0444** – −0.0114 – −0.0560** 
 – (−2.14) – (−0.75) – (−2.00) 
Nurses per bed_25–50_out-of-state – −0.0058 – 0.0070 – −0.0048 
 – (−0.43) – (0.70) – (−0.27) 
Hospital beds_0–25_in-state −5.09e−06** −5.62e−06** −3.16e−06* −2.18e−06 −1.68e−05*** −1.39e−05*** 
 (−2.21) (−2.38) (−2.01) (−1.34) (−6.32) (−5.20) 
Hospital beds_0–25_out-of-state 1.47e−06 1.30e−06 1.33e−06 7.61e−07 −8.23e−08 −1.77e−06 
 (0.65) (0.58) (0.81) (0.50) (0.03) (−0.62) 
Hospital beds_25–50_in-state – −1.70e−06 – −2.65e−06 – −4.85e−06* 
 – (−0.74) – (−1.83) – (−1.69) 
Hospital beds_25–50_out-of-state – −1.16e−06 – −1.90e−06 – −9.03e−06*** 
 – (−0.58) – (−1.42) – (−3.57) 
       
State fixed effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 3108 3108 3108 3108 3105 3105 
R-squared 0.696 0.698 0.714 0.715 0.506 0.510 
*p < 0.1.  ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
a. Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. 
Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of >65 years old, per 
capita income, % in poverty, % of <high school, and unemployment rate (%). 
 
Generally speaking, evidence reported in Table 4a, Table 4b and Table 4c is consistent with spatial 
attenuation of the influence of medical services on nearby patient outcomes. Medical professionals within 
25 miles have a notably higher effect on the primary county’s health status, whereas the effects of doctors 
and nurses beyond this range are not significant in terms of reducing the primary county’s mortality rates 
for heart disease, cancer, and stroke. 
 
5.2. Is there a state border effect? 
In addition to spatial attenuation, estimates reported in Table 4a, Table 4b and Table 4c also help to 
explain whether state borders impede access to nearby medical services. As shown in these tables, the in-
state doctor effect is generally of higher magnitude and more significant than the corresponding out-of-




state doctor effect. This is especially so when focusing on the 25-mile distance band. For instance, in 
Table 4a, the estimated elasticities associated with in-state and out-of-state cardiologists within 25 miles 
are 0.0660 and 0.0110, respectively (1st and 2nd rows, column (a)). The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient for the in-state portion is 0.0550 higher than that of the out-of-state portion. This pattern is 
generally consistent for all three types of diseases and is robust to how the health outcome is measured, 
although in some instances the out-of-state elasticities tend to be imprecisely estimated.28 
Although the evidence for in-state versus out-of-state difference is generally consistent and robust, one 
should still be cautious with interpretation of the state border effect. As discussed earlier, to argue that the 
lesser impact of out-of-state doctors is due to the influence of state borders or state-specific licensing 
laws, I implicitly assume that the attenuation gradient is properly controlled for and potential patient 
immobility across state lines will not contribute to the border effect. If, however, the attenuation pattern 
tends to be more spatially continuous and patients tend to be restricted to access in-state doctors alone due 
to the writing of their insurance policy, the in-state versus out-of-state difference should be better treated 
as a mix of both the attenuation effect and patient immobility across state lines. 
In order to identify the state border effect in a more convincing way, I exploit exogenous variation in 
stringency of state-specific medical licensing policies to examine whether the lesser impact of out-of-state 
doctors is further reduced for states with more stringent policies. This is accomplished by interacting a 
dummy variable for states adopting stricter licensing policies with controls for out-of-state doctors within 
25 miles.29 As shown in column (a), column (b), and column (c) of Table 5, the estimated coefficients 
associated with the interaction terms for three types of diseases are generally positive and significant.30 
This suggests that patient outcomes in states with stricter licensing policies are less likely to be affected 
by the presence of nearby out-of-state doctors. The estimates reported here also help to generate a sense 
of how strong these policies are in deterring out-of-state doctors in treating in-state patients. Specifically, 
taking heart disease as an example, doubling the number of in-state cardiologists within 25 miles reduces 
mortality rates from heart disease by 6.56%. The corresponding impact of out-of-state cardiologists drops 
to 2.46%. Moreover, for states with more stringent licensing policies, doubling the number of out-of-state 
cardiologists only helps to reduce heart disease mortality rates of the primary county by 0.98% (−2.46 + 
1.48). These findings provide further evidence for the existence of state border effect and how state 
licensing policies contribute to this effect. 
 
  
                                                          
28
 The evidence for neurologists within 25–50 miles distance band seems counter-intuitive. For now, I do not have a good 
explanation of it. 
29
 Only 25-mile rings are included in this specification since the effects of various medical inputs beyond this range are 
generally insignificant. 
30
 Results from alternative specifications are reported in Table A3 and Table A4. Estimates are robust to various model 
specifications. 




Table 5. The effect of state-specific medical licensing policies.a Dependent variable: Log Mortality Rate 
of various diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors). 
 Licensing policy dummy Doctors per capita dummy Doctors per square mile dummy 
 Heart 
disease 
Cancer Stroke Heart 
disease 
Cancer Stroke Heart 
disease 
Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
Log (specialists per 
bed)_0–25_in-state 
−0.0656*** −0.0533*** −0.0881*** −0.0660*** −0.0532*** −0.0882*** −0.0666*** −0.0543*** −0.0899*** 
 (−8.06) (−5.73) (−8.24) (−8.11) (−5.73) (−8.25) (−8.17) (−5.81) (−8.41) 
Log (specialists per 
bed)_0–25_out-of-
state 
−0.0246*** −0.0150* −0.0567*** −0.0125 −0.0107 −0.0525*** −0.0135* −0.0109 −0.0565*** 
 (−2.73) (−1.84) (−4.92) (−1.59) (−1.47) (−4.89) (−1.70) (−1.49) (−5.29) 
Log (specialists per 
bed)_0–25_out-of-
state × stringent 
reciprocity rules 
0.0148*** 0.0058* 0.0068 – – – – – – 
 (2.89) (1.79) (1.07) – – – – – – 
Log (specialists per 
bed)_0–25_out-of-
state × (doctors per 
capita > median) 
– – – 0.0060 0.0084*** 0.0091* – – – 
 – – – (1.46) (3.49) (1.73) – – – 
Log (specialists per 
bed)_0–25_out-of-
state × (doctors per 
square mile > 
median) 
– – – – – – 0.0090** 0.0106*** 0.0187*** 
 – – – – – – (2.08) (4.06) (3.24) 
Log (nurses per 
bed)_0–25_in-state 
−0.0517*** −0.0154 −0.0165 −0.0516*** −0.0151 −0.0162 −0.0529*** −0.0171 −0.0189 
 (−3.54) (−1.17) (−0.86) (−3.53) (−1.15) (−0.85) (−3.62) (−1.30) (−0.99) 
Log (nurses per 
bed)_0–25_out-of-
state 
−0.0346** −0.0071 −0.0234 −0.0323** −0.0040 −0.0208 −0.0312** −0.0024 −0.0165 
 (−2.49) (−0.69) (−1.10) (−2.30) (−0.39) (−0.98) (−2.23) (−0.23) (−0.78) 
Log (hospital 
beds)_0–25_in-state 
−0.0052 −0.0172*** −0.0169** −0.0051 −0.0169*** −0.0167** −0.0052 −0.0176*** −0.0173** 




−0.0066 −0.0073 −0.0447*** −0.0042 −0.0041 −0.0423*** −0.0030 −0.0019 −0.0397*** 
 (−1.12) (−1.13) (−5.30) (−0.70) (−0.64) (−5.03) (−0.50) (−0.30) (−4.62) 
          
State fixed effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 3108 3108 3105 3108 3108 3105 3108 3108 3105 
R-squared 0.705 0.722 0.518 0.705 0.722 0.519 0.705 0.722 0.520 
*p < 0.1.  ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
a. Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. 
Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of >65 years old, per 
capita income, % in poverty, % of <high school, and unemployment rate (%). 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
As additional robustness checks, I also experiment with two other ways of instrumenting the stringency of 
the state medical policy environment. The first is to use state-wide per capita number of doctors, and the 
second is to use the number of doctors per square mile. These instruments are motivated by broad 
recognition that there are fewer doctors in rural areas and that rural areas tend to be more proactive in 




trying to attract physicians. In this sense, it is the rural nature of the state, as possibly captured by per 
capita number of doctors and the number of doctors per square mile, that drives related policies that 
govern reciprocity of physician licensing across state lines. 
Table 6 and Table 7 show state rankings by per capita number of doctors and the number of doctors per 
square mile. States with doctor capacity above the median are classified as being more likely to restrict 
entry of out-of-state physicians, whereas the rest are assumed to be less likely to do so. A similar dummy 
variable for policy stringency is created based on the above description and is interacted with the out-of-
state measure of medical professionals. Corresponding results are reported from column (d) to column (i) 
in Table 5. It is shown that the estimated coefficient for the interaction term also tends to be positive and 
significant. This evidence suggests that the impact of out-of-state doctors on nearby patient outcomes is 
higher for rural states that are more proactive in attracting out-of-state physicians. This pattern is 
observed for all three types of diseases considered in this paper. These findings provide further evidence 
for the existence of state border effects that are likely attributable to state policies. 
Table 6. Rank of states by number of doctors per capita (per 100,000 residents). 
Rank State Doctors per capita Rank State Doctors per capita 
1 Washington, DC 81 26 Delaware 28 
2 Massachusetts 51 27 Nebraska 27 
3 New York 44 28 North Dakota 27 
4 Maryland 43 29 New Mexico 27 
5 Vermont 43 30 Missouri 27 
6 Connecticut 41 31 Montana 26 
7 Rhode Island 41 32 Kentucky 25 
8 New Jersey 35 33 West Virginia 25 
9 Pennsylvania 34 34 South Carolina 25 
10 Minnesota 32 35 Kansas 25 
11 Maine 32 36 Indiana 24 
12 New Hampshire 31 37 South Dakota 24 
13 Oregon 31 38 Arizona 24 
14 Illinois 31 39 Alabama 24 
15 Washington 30 40 Georgia 23 
16 California 30 41 Utah 23 
17 Virginia 30 42 Texas 23 
18 Ohio 30 43 Arkansas 22 
19 Florida 29 44 Iowa 21 
20 Louisiana 29 45 Wyoming 21 
21 Colorado 29 46 Nevada 21 
22 Wisconsin 29 47 Mississippi 20 
23 Tennessee 29 48 Oklahoma 19 
24 North Carolina 28 49 Idaho 19 
25 Michigan 28    
   
Another robustness check pertains to alternative distance bands that capture the distribution of local 
medical services. Previous specifications adopt 25 miles as the cutoff distance based on the observation 
that 25 miles roughly correspond to the maximum commuting distance for doctors. To examine how 
sensitive the results are to various radiuses, I also experiment with using 20 miles and 30 miles as the 




cutoff distance in constructing concentric ring measures. I find robust results in both cases. Estimates are 
reported in Table 8. 
 
Table 7. Rank of states by number of doctors per square mile (SM). 
Rank State Doctors per SM Rank State Doctors per SM 
1 Washington, DC 69.7688 26 Louisiana 0.2413 
2 New Jersey 3.4629 27 Missouri 0.2241 
3 Massachusetts 3.1080 28 Alabama 0.2091 
4 Rhode Island 2.7993 29 Texas 0.2037 
5 Connecticut 2.6195 30 Minnesota 0.1933 
6 Maryland 1.9689 31 West Virginia 0.1901 
7 New York 1.5432 32 Colorado 0.1338 
8 Delaware 0.9641 33 Arizona 0.1329 
9 Pennsylvania 0.9232 34 Arkansas 0.1190 
10 Florida 0.8105 35 Oregon 0.1189 
11 Ohio 0.7547 36 Maine 0.1188 
12 Illinois 0.6792 37 Mississippi 0.1181 
13 California 0.6729 38 Iowa 0.1140 
14 Virginia 0.5342 39 Oklahoma 0.0998 
15 North Carolina 0.4697 40 Kansas 0.0848 
16 New Hampshire 0.4413 41 Utah 0.0720 
17 Tennessee 0.4191 42 Nebraska 0.0626 
18 Indiana 0.4174 43 Nevada 0.0488 
19 Georgia 0.3735 44 New Mexico 0.0432 
20 South Carolina 0.3497 45 Idaho 0.0343 
21 Michigan 0.2892 46 South Dakota 0.0247 
22 Vermont 0.2781 47 North Dakota 0.0242 
23 Washington 0.2751 48 Montana 0.0169 
24 Kentucky 0.2672 49 Wyoming 0.0115 
25 Wisconsin 0.2466    
   
As shown in Table 8, the evidence of state border effects remains strong. For each type of disease, the 
estimated coefficients associated with in-state doctor measures are generally of higher magnitude and 
more significant than that of the out-of-state doctor measures within the same distance band. Moreover, 
the coefficient associated with the interaction term tends to be positive and significantly identified, which 
is consistent with findings obtained using 25-mile distance bands adopted earlier. The evidence from 
these alternative distance band setups, therefore, suggests that the main findings in this paper are fairly 
robust to how the concentric ring measures are specified. 
The final set of robustness checks stratifies the sample by population density. Specifically, I estimate the 
model separately for the top 900 counties that are most densely populated as well as for the rest of the 
counties that are in low-density areas. This is based on the idea that agglomeration economies tend to be 
more pronounced when there are more doctors available in highly concentrated areas. The results 
reported in Table 9 confirm this expectation. Specifically, focusing on the mortality rates from cancer for 
instance, the estimated elasticity associated with nearby in-state oncologists in more densely populated 




areas is 0.1123 (first row, column (b)), whereas the corresponding elasticity associated with oncologists 
in less densely populated areas reduces to 0.0170 (first row, column (e)). Similar patterns can also be 
found for heart disease and stroke. This evidence further suggests that there may exist spillovers from 
spatial concentration of medical services that enhance the productivity of treating patients. 
 
Table 8. The effect of state-specific medical policies.a Dependent variable: Log Mortality Rate of various 
diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors). 
 Use 20 miles as cutoff instead of 25 miles Use 30 miles as cutoff instead of 25 miles 
 Heart 
disease 
Cancer Stroke Heart disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-
cutoff_in-state 
−0.0681*** −0.0549*** −0.0991*** −0.0611*** −0.0508*** −0.0831*** 
 (−8.65) (−5.92) (−9.45) (−7.32) (−5.51) (−7.68) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-
cutoff_out-of-state 
−0.0181* −0.0069 −0.0398*** −0.0270*** −0.0177** −0.0563*** 
 (−1.83) (−0.73) (−3.00) (−3.32) (−2.45) (−5.42) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-
cutoff_out-of-state × 
      
Stringent reciprocity rules 0.0170*** 0.0046 −0.0013 0.0165*** 0.0059** 0.0023 
 (3.22) (1.43) (−0.19) (3.51) (2.01) (0.40) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0-
cutoff_in-state 
−0.0491*** −0.0194* −0.0114 −0.0552*** −0.0113 −0.0159 
 (−3.81) (−1.79) (−0.68) (−3.36) (−0.74) (−0.74) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0-
cutoff_out-of-state 
−0.0409*** −0.0112 −0.0328 −0.0282** −0.0007 −0.0017 
 (−2.95) (−1.14) (−1.46) (−2.01) (−0.06) (−0.08) 
Log (hospital beds)_0-cutoff 
_in-state 
−0.0089* −0.0211*** −0.0262*** −0.0007 −0.0124*** −0.0106 
 (−1.82) (−4.03) (−3.63) (−0.14) (−2.74) (−1.48) 
Log (hospital beds)_0-
cutoff_out-of-state 
0.0002 −0.0011 −0.0379*** −0.0073 −0.0095* −0.0460*** 
 (0.03) (−0.14) (−3.73) (−1.43) (−1.67) (−6.20) 
       
State fixed effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 3108 3108 3105 3108 3108 3105 
R-squared 0.707 0.723 0.521 0.703 0.721 0.516 
*p < 0.1.  ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
a. Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. 
Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of >65 years old, per 
capita income, % in poverty, % of <high school, and unemployment rate (%). 
 
  




Table 9. The effect of state-specific medical policies.a Dependent variable: Log Mortality Rate of various 
diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors). 
 High population density areas Low population density areas 
 Heart disease Cancer Stroke Heart disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0–25_in-state −0.0655*** −0.1123*** −0.0991** −0.0487*** −0.0170*** −0.0420*** 
 (−2.76) (−3.02) (−2.52) (−5.34) (−2.63) (−3.46) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0–25_out-of-
state 
−0.0585 −0.0650 −0.0335 −0.0175** −0.0017 −0.0336*** 
 (−1.50) (−1.00) (−0.42) (−2.02) (−0.22) (−2.94) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0–25_out-of-
state × stringent reciprocity rules 
0.0236 0.0288** 0.0018 0.0131*** 0.0020 0.0023 
 (1.59) (2.02) (0.09) (2.75) (0.82) (0.39) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0–25_in-state −0.0587** −0.0043 −0.0098 −0.0499*** −0.0346*** −0.0602** 
 (−2.57) (−0.19) (−0.32) (−2.65) (−2.70) (−2.45) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0199 0.0001 0.0132 −0.0263* −0.0058 −0.0254 
 (−0.64) (0.00) (0.26) (−1.78) (−0.63) (−1.22) 
Log (hospital beds)_0–25_in-state −0.0010 −0.0603** −0.0124 −0.0085 −0.0099** −0.0264*** 
 (−0.06) (−2.23) (−0.39) (−1.52) (−2.09) (−3.59) 
Log (hospital beds)_0–25_out-of-state −0.0218 −0.0332 −0.0016 −0.0041 0.0013 −0.0325*** 
 (−0.69) (−0.52) (−0.02) (−0.70) (0.20) (−3.85) 
       
State fixed effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 900 900 900 2208 2208 2205 
R-squared 0.705 0.722 0.518 0.705 0.722 0.519 
*p < 0.1.  ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. 
a. Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. 
Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of >65 years old, per 
capita income, % in poverty, % of <high school, and unemployment rate (%). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that spatial concentration of medical services improves local population 
health outcomes and the influence tends to attenuate with geographic distance. Estimates suggest that a 
10% increase in the number of doctors that are present within 25 miles of the primary county reduces 
mortality rates from heart disease, cancer, and stroke by 0.660%, 0.533%, and 0.882%, respectively. The 
effect of doctors further away tends to be statistically insignificant and smaller in magnitude. The impact 
of nearby doctors is found to be stronger in areas where medical services are more concentrated. 
The second result is that state-specific licensing policies that restrict out-of-state doctors from practicing 
across state boundaries impede patient access to nearby out-of-state physicians and, thereby, reduce the 
health outcome of residents living in border areas. The smaller impact of out-of-state doctors is further 
reduced when the primary state adopts more stringent physician licensing policies. Two other ways of 
capturing the border effect, by drawing on state variation in per capita number of doctors and number of 
doctors per square mile, yield consistent results. The latter is based on the argument that rural states that 
face shortages of medical professionals tend to design policies in a way that is more attractive to out-of-
state doctors. 
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Table A1: The Effect of State-Specific Medical Policies (Linear-Log Model) a 
Dependent Variable: Mortality Rate of Various Diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors) 
 Licensing Policy Dummy Doctors per Capita Dummy Doctors per Square Mile Dummy 
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0173*** -0.0083*** -0.0059*** -0.0174*** -0.0083*** -0.0059*** -0.0176*** -0.0085*** -0.0060*** 
 (-8.52) (-7.31) (-9.26) (-8.57) (-7.31) (-9.26) (-8.61) (-7.41) (-9.38) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0083*** -0.0028** -0.0034*** -0.0046** -0.0022** -0.0030*** -0.0048** -0.0022** -0.0032*** 
 (-3.47) (-2.41) (-4.95) (-2.28) (-2.07) (-4.70) (-2.35) (-2.05) (-4.94) 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× Stringent Reciprocity Rules 0.0045*** 0.0009* 0.0007 - - - - - - 
 (2.93) (1.74) (1.48) - - - - - - 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× (Doctors per capita > median) - - - 0.0015 0.0012*** 0.0005 - - - 
 - - - (1.25) (3.09) (1.31) - - - 
Log (# of specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state 
× (Doctors per square mile > median) - - - - - - 0.0020 0.0014*** 0.0011** 
 - - - - - - (1.57) (3.28) (2.58) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0118*** -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0117*** -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0120*** -0.0026 -0.0011 
 (-3.03) (-1.25) (-0.72) (-3.01) (-1.22) (-0.72) (-3.09) (-1.36) (-0.84) 
Log (# of nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0110*** -0.0012 -0.0029* -0.0104*** -0.0008 -0.0027* -0.0102*** -0.0006 -0.0025 
 (-2.80) (-0.71) (-1.79) (-2.63) (-0.45) (-1.69) (-2.58) (-0.36) (-1.54) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_in-state -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0018*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0018*** -0.0030*** -0.0032*** -0.0018*** 
 (-2.71) (-4.72) (-4.34) (-2.68) (-4.67) (-4.31) (-2.71) (-4.80) (-4.39) 
Log (# of hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0026* -0.0017* -0.0025*** -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0023*** -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0022*** 
 (-1.85) (-1.78) (-5.27) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-4.89) (-1.18) (-1.01) (-4.50) 
State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 




Observations 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 
R-squared 0.685 0.743 0.478 0.684 0.744 0.478 0.684 0.744 0.479 
a
 Specialists refer to cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A2: The Effect of State-Specific Medical Policies (Log-Linear Model) a 
Dependent Variable: Log Mortality Rate of Various Diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors) 
 
 Licensing Policy Dummy Doctors per Capita Dummy Doctors per Square Mile Dummy 
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
Specialists per bed_0-25_in-state -1.6207*** -3.3737*** -2.4554*** -1.6272*** -3.4623*** -2.4810*** -1.6489*** -3.5300*** -2.5447*** 
 (-2.88) (-3.19) (-3.09) (-2.89) (-3.30) (-3.12) (-2.87) (-3.38) (-3.16) 
Specialists per bed_0-25_out-of-state -0.0619*** -0.0332** -0.0175 -0.0353*** -0.0211*** -0.0228 -0.0443*** -0.0285*** -0.0421** 
 (-3.55) (-2.26) (-0.76) (-3.35) (-2.67) (-1.44) (-3.60) (-3.01) (-2.41) 
Specialists per bed_0-25_out-of-state × 
Stringent Reciprocity Rules 0.0484** 0.0297* 0.0134 - - - - - - 
 (2.51) (1.88) (0.52) - - - - - - 
Specialists per bed_0-25_out-of-state × 
(Doctors per capita > median) - - - 0.0257 0.0262** 0.0387* - - - 
 - - - (1.59) (2.23) (1.78) - - - 
Specialists per bed_0-25_out-of-state × 
(Doctors per square mile > median) - - - - - - 0.0384** 0.0355*** 0.0692*** 
 - - - - - - (2.35) (3.03) (3.03) 
Nurses per bed_0-25_in-state -0.0864*** -0.0277** -0.0490** -0.0863*** -0.0271** -0.0482** -0.0883*** -0.0291** -0.0421** 
 (-5.42) (-2.21) (-2.40) (-5.46) (-2.18) (-2.37) (-5.57) (-2.34) (-2.41) 
Nurses per bed_0-25_out-of-state -0.0439*** -0.0100 -0.0490*** -0.0397*** -0.0064 -0.0446** -0.0378*** -0.0049 0.0692*** 
 (-3.51) (-1.06) (-2.65) (-3.17) (-0.68) (-2.42) (-3.03) (-0.53) (3.03) 
Hospital beds_0-25_in-state -4.56e-06** -3.49e-06** -1.70e-05*** -5.28e-06** -2.96e-06* -1.65e-05*** -5.29e-06** -2.98e-06* -1.64e-05*** 
 (-2.00) (-2.21) (-6.38) (-2.28) (-1.87) (-6.20) (-2.27) (-1.88) (-6.13) 




Hospital beds_0-25_out-of-state 1.55e-06 1.38e-06 -6.22e-08 1.72e-06 1.59e-06 3.00e-07 2.05e-06 1.88e-06 9.61e-07 
 (0.69) (0.85) (-0.02) (0.77) (1.00) (0.10) (0.92) (1.19) (0.32) 
State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105 
R-squared 0.698 0.715 0.506 0.698 0.715 0.506 0.698 0.715 0.507 
a
 Specialists refer to cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3: The Effect of State-Specific Medical Policies a 
Dependent Variable: Log Mortality Rate of Various Diseases (%) (t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors) 
 
 Metro Areas Non-Metro Areas 
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0681*** -0.0472*** -0.0687*** -0.0485*** -0.0284*** -0.0578*** 
 (-5.20) (-2.61) (-3.86) (-3.94) (-3.44) (-3.45) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0478*** -0.0260 -0.0983*** -0.0144 -0.0075 -0.0249* 
 (-2.61) (-1.02) (-3.41) (-1.45) (-0.93) (-1.95) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state ×  
Stringent Reciprocity Rules 0.0246*** 0.0137** 0.0139 0.0085 0.0007 -0.0072 
 (2.99) (2.00) (1.23) (1.47) (0.25) (-1.03) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0382** -0.0134 0.0065 -0.0438* -0.0171 -0.0544 
 (-2.06) (-0.70) (0.27) (-1.73) (-1.11) (-1.60) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0221 -0.0234 0.0205 -0.0427** 0.0062 -0.0598** 
 (-1.12) (-1.49) (0.62) (-2.20) (0.49) (-2.33) 
Log (hospital beds)_0-25_in-state -0.0020 -0.0034 0.0106 -0.0028 -0.0087* -0.0052 




 (-0.22) (-0.29) (0.77) (-0.47) (-1.72) (-0.62) 
Log (hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0201 -0.0131 -0.0749*** -0.0023 -0.0035 -0.0275*** 
 (-1.45) (-0.56) (-2.96) (-0.38) (-0.54) (-3.03) 
State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,332 1,332 1,329 
R-squared 0.703 0.723 0.501 0.702 0.722 0.503 
a
 Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. Other control variables include % Black, % Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of > 65years old, per capita income, 
% in poverty, % of < high school, and unemployment rate (%). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table A4: The Effect of State-Specific Medical Policies a 
Dependent Variable: Log Mortality Rate of Various Diseases (%) 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors) 
 
 Heart Disease Cancer Stroke 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0654*** -0.0534*** -0.0885*** 
 (-8.04) (-5.75) (-8.26) 
Log (specialists per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0238*** -0.0138* -0.0518*** 
 (-2.70) (-1.73) (-4.54) 
Log(# of doctors per bed)_0-25_out × 
Maximum Year Constraint 0.0324*** 0.0031 -0.0144 
 (3.56) (0.54) (-1.07) 
Log(# of doctors per bed)_0-25_out ×  
Interview Requirement 0.0171*** 0.0065** 0.0064 
 (3.33) (2.07) (0.97) 
Log(# of doctors per bed)_0-25_out × Both 
Requirements 0.0081 0.0025 -0.0069 
 (1.31) (0.66) (-0.88) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0-25_in-state -0.0526*** -0.0158 -0.0178 
 (-3.59) (-1.20) (-0.93) 
Log (nurses per bed)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0361*** -0.0071 -0.0224 
 (-2.60) (-0.70) (-1.06) 
Log (hospital beds)_0-25_in-state -0.0050 -0.0172*** -0.0171** 
 (-1.04) (-3.65) (-2.43) 
Log (hospital beds)_0-25_out-of-state -0.0058 -0.0067 -0.0438*** 
 (-0.99) (-1.03) (-5.18) 
State Fixed Effects 49 49 49 
Observations 3,108 3,108 3,105 
R-squared 0.706 0.722 0.519 
a
 Specialists stand for cardiologists for heart disease, oncologists for cancer, and neurologists for stroke. Other control variables include % Black, % 
Asian, % Hispanic, % of uninsured, % of > 65years old, per capita income, % in poverty, % of < high school, and unemployment rate (%). *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
